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OPENING REMARKS
This Topical Issue is adapted from a submission in response to the Australian government’s discussion paper Leading 
Practice Agreements: Maximizing Outcomes from Native Title Benefits.1
By way of background this is my third submission to a package of reforms proposals circulated for discussion by 
the Rudd and now Gillard governments that seek to promote ‘leading practice in the governance of native title 
payments and in agreement making’. These reform proposals have been progressively released by the Department 
of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), the Treasury and now the Attorney-
General’s Department. 
My first submission was lodged on 13 February 2009 and commented on the Australian government Discussion 
Paper ‘Optimising Benefits from Native Title Agreements’ and ‘the Report of the Native Title Payments Working 
Group’. That submission was not made public by FaHCSIA but has been electronically published as CAEPR Topical 
Issue 3/2009.2
My second submission was lodged on 2 July 2010 with Treasury and made comment on the Australian government’s 
Consultation Paper ‘Native Title, Indigenous Economic Development and Tax’. This submission will be made 
public, but the consultation was suspended owing to the August election and so I append to this submission my 
recommendation to the earlier consultation paper. Impatient at the slowness of the process I have also made a 
version of my submission publicly available as ‘Native Title and taxation reform’ CAEPR Topical Issue 4/2010.3
The reference to these earlier submissions is provided because they raise a number of issues of relevance to the 
current discussion paper, most especially in relation to the historical lack of clarity, since the 1950s, about the 
nature of payments made in benefit sharing agreements with Indigenous Australians. I will not revisit these issues 
in any great detail here but merely draw attention to them in case the inter-departmental process that is currently 
under way overlooks my attempts to provide some ‘whole-of-issues’ perspective on payments under both land 
rights and native title laws.
1. Available at <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Consultationsreformsandreviews_
Consultationonpossiblegovernanceandfutureactsreforms>.
2. Available at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2009TI3.php>.
3. Available at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2010TI4.php>.
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By way of personal background, I have researched these issues domestically since 1982 and so seek to 
provide some historical perspective on a number of complex issues about which current policy making 
seeks somewhat ahistorical and technical solutions. My academic perspective is that of anthropology of 
development and political economy so I focus on Indigenous perspectives on property rights and on how 
the powerful in Australian society, members of political and bureaucratic classes, exercise control over 
the less powerful such as native title groups. I am also interested in global comparative perspectives on 
such issues having been retained as a collaborative researcher by the United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development on a project Identity, Power and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006–2008). 
I provide this background because this submission draws largely on my own research publications since 
19824 that in the interests of readability I will not fully reference. Readers though might be interested in a 
recently completed monograph Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous Australians and Mining (J.C. Altman 
and D.F. Martin editors) published by ANU E Press in 2009.5
I provide my submission in good faith, but it would be disingenuous if I did not raise one concern 
I harbour about the current policy-making processes managed by the Australian Public Service. Much 
of the Discussion Paper focuses on the issue of transparency, but it seems to me that while the process 
is nominally transparent, in that submissions will be made public, it is effectively very opaque because 
no explanation is provided on how submissions might be assessed for policy-making input. This seems 
to me to be an emerging wider issue when reviews are managed within the Australian Public Service 
rather than through more transparent parliamentary inquiry processes where at least the use that is made 
of submissions is clearly acknowledged and where written submissions are generally supplemented by 
verbal evidence published in Hansard. I make this point to at least encourage a clearer reference to policy 
development processes in response to this Discussion Paper and submissions lodged.
In my submission I do not specifically address the Discussion Paper’s 35 consultation questions but rather 
focus on the following five key ‘big picture’ issues and end with a brief conclusion and six recommendations. 
The key issues are:
1. What is the nature of payments received in agreements by native title groups?
2. Does the Australian government, or its agents, have the moral authority to play a role in regulating 
the use of such payments?
3. Why should such payments deliver sustainable financial benefits and why should the Australian 
government promote such a strategy?
4. Should the Australian government consider other means to ensure that native title groups receive 
equitable agreement payments?
5. Is it equitable to use the tax system to discipline entities that receive native title payments?
4. See in particular Altman, J.C. 1983. Aborigines and Mining Royalties in the Northern Territory, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies, Canberra.
5. See <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/mono/2009RM30.php>. 
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1. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF NATIVE TITLE BENEFITS RECEIVED IN AGREEMENTS BY NATIVE 
TITLE GROUPS?
The Discussion Paper notes at the outset (p.4) that the Australian government regards native title 
agreement-making and resulting benefit sharing agreements as playing a potential role in its overarching 
policy goal to Close the Gap. This is not a surprising government objective, but it needs to be recognised 
as the government’s objective and not one that is necessary shared by native title groups who have signed 
benefit sharing agreements. Similarly, it is noted that native title agreements can be highly variable, and so 
the Discussion Paper appears to have a dual focus: first, to ensure that recipients of the growing number 
of individual agreements that deliver many millions of dollars each year should ensure that ‘benefits are 
deployed for the benefit of both current and future generations’; and second, to provide information to 
facilitate better agreement outcomes for native title groups. The main focus of the Discussion Paper is 
understandably on situations where the results generated by large monetary payments from agreements 
generally with resource developers are regarded as poor. The Discussion Paper refers in a very general sense 
to stakeholders raising concerns about poor outcomes, yet simultaneously it is noted that there is a lack 
of information about ‘the quantity and quality of native title agreements which can lead to differing 
perceptions about the nature and use of benefits obtained through them, and lead to concerns’.
I am concerned that the Discussion Paper itself makes no attempt to clarify such diverse perceptions. 
And so as in my earlier submission on native title taxation,6 I sought to raise the issue of whether native title 
agreement payments are compensatory (for loss or impairment of native title) or a form of commercially 
negotiated revenue provided to real property owners or claimants who are using the right to negotiate as a 
lever to capture a share of (usually) mineral rent? In reality payments usually incorporate elements of both 
with the agreements struck either through negotiation or legal arbitration and/or assessment.
A first order issue then that I revisit is what is the nature of native title benefits? While the Discussion 
Paper focuses on its vision for native title that effectively came into operation in 1994, this is an issue of 
a longer history that goes back to 1952 when the Commonwealth was directly administering the Northern 
Territory. Up until 1978, all statutory royalties raised on Aboriginal reserves were earmarked for Aboriginal 
use and were deemed broadly compensatory. Subsequently with passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA), a diversity of payments could be negotiated in the NT mainly because 
free prior informed consent rights (sometimes referred to as veto rights) constituted a de facto mineral 
right and so provided negotiation leverage. The resulting benefit sharing regime is complex because not 
only did the Australian government guarantee all or most statutory mining royalty equivalents (SMREs) to 
Aboriginal interests (with 30% reserved for the owners or residents of areas affected), but land owners and 
others could negotiate additional monetary and non-monetary benefits above this compensatory base, 
while land owners could also receive any statutory and negotiated development lease payments.
The NT situation, which is not mentioned in the Discussion Paper, has created a precedent whereby the 
Australian government has adopted a somewhat paternalistic regulatory role in relation to agreement 
benefits. This is partly because the statutory land rights architecture has provided considerable oversighting 
and controlling powers to the federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs especially in relation to the financial 
activities and performance of the Aboriginals Benefit Account. It is also because the Australian government 
has always asserted that SMREs are public moneys and so it has an interest in ensuring appropriate 
outcomes from their use. It should be noted that Aboriginal land owners and their representative land 
councils have not shared this governmental view at least since the early 1980s.
6. Available at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2010TI4.php>.
SMREs: 
statutory mining 
royalty equivalents
ALRA: 
Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976
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Native title agreements are different because in general agreements are struck with private sector 
interests and the amounts are not directly linked to statutory payments like royalties paid to the crown 
(governments), although they might be influenced by a development’s profitability and/or the amount 
of statutory payment. At times, there might be a mix of payments from private and public sources. An 
example of such an agreement is the Century Mine Agreement signed in 1997 that included a twenty-year 
benefits package made up of $60 million from Pasminco (subsequently Zinifex, then OZ Minerals, now 
China Minmetals) and $30 million from the Queensland State government.
There is also the issue, raised by legal tax academic Fiona Martin in a recent article7 that some payments or 
part of payments may be non-taxable—therefore falling outside the tax regime altogether. This is because 
they are capital payments for loss or permanent damage to the native title which is a pre-capital gains 
tax (CGT) asset. In tax law terminology, these payments are compensation for loss of a capital asset and 
therefore not income. As the capital asset is pre-1985 (CGT) it is not caught by the CGT regime which is 
part of the income tax assessment act.
The key issue that I am raising here is that the Discussion Paper fails to address whether payments are 
compensation or a form of revenue (mineral rent sharing); and whether they are public or private; and 
whether they are compensation for loss of capital (and non taxable) or income? There is an emerging 
literature on these issues that needs to be considered.
2. DOES THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, OR ITS AGENTS, HAVE THE MORAL AUTHORITY TO 
PLAY A ROLE IN ADVISING ON AGREEMENT MAKING OR REGULATING THE USE OF NATIVE 
TITLE PAYMENTS?
If we assume that native title agreements are agreements between native title groups and commercial 
interests then surely payments are of a private nature and so no more subject to government regulation 
than a similar payment to any other land owner.
In any case, it could be argued that the Australian government, or its direct agents, could be conflicted 
on three counts that would undermine its moral authority to play a role either in advising on agreement 
making or in regulating the use of native title payments.
First, and most directly, as noted above, there is a risk that what is determined to be appropriate outcomes 
will be set by the Australian government and its Closing the Gap framework (as measured by available 
statistics) rather than by the priorities of native title groups. Examples might be decisions to invest in 
forms of employment, housing, health services or education by native title groups that do not match the 
Australian government’s normalisation goals.
Second, and related, there is a risk that the Australian government will cost shift its responsibilities to native 
title groups, and associated financial implications, onto native title agreements. In so far as payments are 
compensatory this would offset any likely net benefits.
Third, and indirectly, the Australian government itself is highly dependent on revenues from commercial 
development, especially mineral extraction, on native title lands. Recent debates about the now defunct 
Resource Super Profits Tax and the still currently proposed Mineral Resource Rent Tax indicate that the 
Australian government is looking to expand the share of mineral rent that is paid to consolidated revenue. 
This goal could be in direct competition with the goal of native title groups to maximise their share of 
7. Martin, F. 2010. ‘Native Title payments and their tax consequences: Is the Federal Government’s recommendation of a 
withholding tax the best approach?’, The University of New South Wales Law Journal, 33 (3): 685-713.
CGT:
capital gains tax
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mineral rents in compensatory and/or commercial agreements. Given that the Australian government 
provides licence to operate to miners, in such contests over rents clear power imbalances make it possible 
that native title groups will receive less as governments receive more.
This suggests to me that the Australian government must be at arms-length in advisory or regulatory roles 
on such matters where there might be actual or perceived conflict of interest.
3. WHY SHOULD SUCH PAYMENTS DELIVER SUSTAINABLE FINANCIAL BENEFITS AND WHY 
SHOULD THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PROMOTE SUCH A STRATEGY?
The sound principle of a sustainable stream of financial benefit from native title agreements cannot 
be questioned and has similarities to the principle of sovereign wealth funds more generally. But the 
implementation of such principles in practice requires judgments to be made about the relative merits 
of current versus future needs. In research and consultancy work that I have undertaken with boards of 
Aboriginal incorporated organisations in a number of jurisdictions this issue of financial policy trade-
off arises regularly; and getting the right balance especially when working with groups that are often 
extremely poor and with urgent immediate need is no easy task.
I am strongly in favour of any strategy that will empower native title groups to enjoy a sustainable benefit 
stream from a native title agreement, if that is their aspiration. But I do not believe that such a requirement 
can be either mandated or imposed, especially when successive Australian governments have shown no 
leadership on this front. Nor am I sure that recent or current Australian governments are well placed to 
promulgate such a strategy given their track record during the current mining boom and the current state 
of the nation’s budget. Interestingly, there are very well-known models that Australian governments could 
have aimed to replicate like the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund known as the Government Pension 
Fund. Presumably they have chosen not to for reasons of political expediency rather than absence of 
information or institutional barriers.
The language of sustainability is very much in vogue at present. But again we need to ask what is the 
purpose of native title agreement payments. If the purpose is compensatory then offsetting immediate 
negative impacts for the current generation might be more important than building a sustainable income 
stream for future generations. In the above-mentioned monograph Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous 
Australians and Mining contributors Sarah Holcombe and Benedict Scambary both refer to the Aboriginal-
articulation view that ‘we have the richest trusts but are the poorest people’ to illustrate local perspectives 
that the balance between current and future priority is wrong. The need to adopt Intergenerational equity 
arguments depends on the nature of the impact—the more short-term the impact the less grounds for 
concerns about financial sustainability.
It is also noteworthy that a focus on financial sustainability can divert attention from the efficacy of 
expenditures and investment policies. As an example, the Aboriginals Benefit Account has had little 
trouble building up its corpus to over $300 million by maintaining a low granting to assets ratio, but this 
performance has perhaps diverted attention from whether the rate of return on investments is adequate 
and whether grants made have either been in accord with Aboriginal aspirations or have delivered desired 
outcomes from the perspective of Aboriginal people? It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth Minister 
for Indigenous Affairs rather than Aboriginal stakeholders in the NT has the final say on both savings ratio 
for the Aboriginals Benefit Account and all disbursements. 
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4. SHOULD THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDER OTHER MEANS TO ENSURE THAT NATIVE 
TITLE GROUPS RECEIVE EQUITABLE AGREEMENT PAYMENTS?
The Discussion Paper looks to empower native title groups to be in a position to accrue better native title 
agreement outcomes with information and associated capacity; and then to ensure better agreement 
outcomes through the improvement of governance arrangements. It is undeniable that such enhanced 
capacity will assist.
What is most likely to generate more equitable agreements is equity between the ALRA agreement 
negotiation regime and that available to native title groups under the Native Title Act future acts and 
agreement making frameworks. As already noted, under ALRA, the Australian government shares its royalty 
take with Aboriginal interests (in relation to the prescribed substance uranium) or provides the equivalent 
of royalties raised by the Northern Territory government under its Minerals Royalty Act (that is a 20% 
profits based royalty) or its Petroleum Royalty Act (that is 10% ad valorem based). And the free prior 
informed consent provisions under ALRA are recognised as being a powerful lever that constitutes a de 
facto mineral right.
So the Australian government could amend the NTA to provide similar free prior informed consent rights 
(and associated leverage) to native title groups and it could either pay SMREs (either 100% or on some 
proportional basis) in relation to mining on native title lands and/or hypothecate a portion of resource 
rents for native title groups assuming the new law is passed.
To date, the Australian government has used the High Court decision in Western Australia v Ward that 
property rights in subsurface minerals are vested in the crown to deny native title groups’ access to SMREs. 
Lisa Strelein in Compromised Jurisprudence (2009: 63) has referred to this decision as a problematic 
fiction that has to be seen as a political compromise, and I concur. At least if the Australian government 
hypothecated a share of SMREs or resource rents for native title groups it would have greater moral 
authority to influence their expenditures because it could argue that it has a legitimate role in monitoring 
the use of public money.
5. IS IT EQUITABLE TO USE THE TAX SYSTEM TO DISCIPLINE ENTITIES THAT RECEIVE NATIVE 
TITLE PAYMENTS ?
It seems a little pre-emptive to suggest that either tax concessions or new tax liabilities will be used by 
government to disciple entities that receive native title payments but expend them in a manner that is 
not acceptable to the Australian government or some independent statutory watchdog. I say this for 
two reasons.
First, is the question of whether to exempt native title payments from a Native Title Withholding Tax 
given the historical experience of inequity and inefficiency and lack of transparency associated with the 
Mining Withholding Tax introduced in 1979 to recoup a proportion of SMREs paid under ALRA. Experience 
suggests that purpose-designing a tax based effectively on statute-based exceptionalism can be highly 
problematic. These issues are currently under consideration by the Treasury in its inquiry ‘Native Title, 
Indigenous Economic Development and Tax. This proposal seems to me to be a little pre-emptive, and 
possibly provocative, given that the Treasury Consultation Paper canvasses income tax exemption for 
native title payments as one of three possible approaches.
Second, and returning to the issue of compensation (or revenue?), there is no comparable treatment of any 
other individual or group in Australian society in such a way. Others land owners are at liberty to expend 
their compensation payments as they see fit. At a time when the nation is considering constitutional 
amendment so as to be more inclusive of Indigenous Australians and to delete any negative race-based 
exceptionalism from the Australian Constitution, such an approach has the distinct appearance of being 
race-based because native title groups can only be Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders.
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Discussion Paper considered here has as its sub-title ‘maximising outcomes from native title benefits’ 
but much of it also focuses on maximising benefits from native title agreements. In my view there is 
a more important role for the Australian government in the latter focus. While I concur that sound 
governance, better information and enhanced capacity will all improve the likelihood that native title 
groups will accrue better outcomes from agreements I am less convinced that there is a regulatory role 
for government here. 
I conclude with the following recommendations and commentary:
1. If the Australian government wants to improve the leverage power of native title groups so 
that they can achieve better financial outcomes in agreements then it should take steps to make 
the Native Title Act agreement negotiation framework as powerful as that in ALRA. This essentially 
means providing free prior informed consent rights to native title groups rather than just right to 
negotiate or right to consultation or to be informed.
2. If the Australian government wants to exercise a legitimate regulatory role over the expenditure 
of agreement payments (or a portion of agreement payments) then it should earmark a proportion 
of its royalties income for native title groups. Then at least it could argue that its regulatory role is 
justified by the provision of public moneys. 
3. If the Australian government genuinely believes that agreements should generate a sustainable 
income stream for future generations then it should demonstrate leadership by establishing a 
sustainable Australian Sovereign Wealth Fund based on the Norwegian precedent. Such leadership 
would be preferable to attempts to force the relatively poor and powerless to adopt such a principle.
4. The Australian government should empower Prescribed Bodies Corporate, Registered Native 
Title Body Corporates and Native Title Representatives by ensuring that they are well resourced to 
engage independent and high quality commercial advice funded by corporate sector or from the 
public purse. An alternative that could be considered is to commit a proportion of SMREs to such 
activity, as has occurred with Aboriginal land councils in the Northern Territory since 1978.
5. It is important that the potentially conflicted position of the Australian government in this arena 
is recognised. It is in a complex triangulated relationship with major corporations on one hand and 
native title groups on the other. The Australian government has a vested interest, for example, in 
mineral extraction as this is a source not just of government revenue but also employment and 
regional development. Consequently it is in a difficult position as regulator of another interest 
group that is also seeking revenue in relation to mineral extraction on native title lands.
6. In Globalisation and its Discontents Joseph Stiglitz implores governments to seek ideology free 
or at least ideologically consistent solutions to complex and diverse challenges. Such lofty goals 
might be difficult to achieve, although not long ago the Rudd government was committed to 
evidence-based policy making, a commitment that the Gillard government has arguably affirmed 
in accepting all recommendation of the Moran Review’s recommendations in Ahead of the Game: 
Blueprint for Reform of Australian Government Administration. 
7. It is my view that as soon as Closing the Gap becomes the foundation of policy it becomes ideology-
laden. It is important in any policy reform of native title agreement making and implementation 
that the government maintains Australia’s liberal democratic commitment to pluralism that should 
allow native title groups to use their compensation payments in the manner they see fit.

